The Analytical Narrative Project by Bates, Robert et al.
 
The Analytical Narrative Project
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly
available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story
matters.
Citation Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent
Rosenthal, and Barry R. Weingast. 2000. The Analytical
Narrative Project. American Political Science Review 94(3):
696-702.
Published Version doi:10.2307/2585843
Accessed February 18, 2015 1:17:55 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3710302
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and
conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-
3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAAAnalytic Narratives  September 2000 
The  Analytic  Narrative  Project 
ROBERT  H. BATES  Harvard University 
AVNER  GREIF  Stanford University 
MARGARET  LEVI  University  of Washington 
JEAN-LAURENT  ROSENTHAL  University  of California, Los Angeles 
BARRY  R. WEINGAST  Stanford University 
In  Analytic Narratives,  we attempt to address several 
issues. First, many of us are engaged  in in-depth 
case studies, but we also seek to contribute to, and 
to make use of, theory. How might we best proceed? 
Second, the historian, the anthropologist, and the area 
specialist possess knowledge of a place and time. They 
have an understanding of  the  particular. How  might 
they best employ such data to create and test theories 
that  may  apply more  generally? Third, what  is  the 
contribution of  formal theory? What benefits are, or 
can  be,  secured  by  formalizing verbal  accounts?  In 
recent years, King, Keohane,  and Verba  (1994)  and 
Green and Shapiro (1994) have provoked debate over 
these and related issues. In Analytic Narratives,  we join 
in  the  methodological  discussions  spawned  by  their 
contributions. 
In one  sense, the aim of our book is quite modest: 
We hope to clarify the commonalities in approach used 
by a number of scholars, including us. We do not claim 
to be developing a brand new method. Rather, we are 
systematizing and making explicit-and  labeling-what 
others also attempt.1 In another sense, the aim of the 
book is ambitious; by trying to systematize we begin to 
force ourselves and others to lay out the rules for doing 
analytic narratives and to clarify how such an approach 
advances knowledge. We realize that our book is only 
a first step and concur with another of our reviewers: 
"As a method,  analytic narrative is clearly still in its 
infancy, but it has promise" (Goldstone  1999, 533). 
We have an additional aim: to transcend some of the 
current and unproductive "tribal warfare," especially 
between the new economic versus historical institution- 
alists  and  between  advocates  of  unbounded  and 
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bounded  rationality. We  believe  that  each  of  these 
perspectives brings something of value, and to different 
degrees the essays in our book represent an integration 
of perspectives. By explicitly outlining an approach that 
relies on rational choice and mathematical models, we 
do not mean to imply that other approaches lack rigor 
but, rather, to reveal how to apply our tools in a useful 
and explanatory way. We wish to join the debate, not 
claim an end to it. 
Part of that debate is among the five of us. Achieving 
a minimal degree  of  consensus was no  easy task. By 
including  a  set  of  individually authored  essays  that 
reveal  both  our  commonalities  and  differences,  we 
indicate the  range of  possible  approaches while  also 
attempting to  create boundaries. The  five studies  all 
draw from the same general rational choice approach. 
Even Levi's norms of fairness are modeled in terms of 
rational choice  (in fact, this is part of Elster's objec- 
tion). We have accepted rational choice theory and are 
among those  attempting to extend it in historical and 
comparative  research.  We  are  imperialists  if  that 
means believing, as Gary Becker did when he applied 
neoclassical economics  to the family and to  discrimi- 
nation,  that  the  domain  of  rational  choice  can  be 
usefully enlarged. We are not imperialists if that means 
believing that rational choice theory is the only possible 
approach to historical and comparative research. 
The central problem we tackle in Analytic Narratives 
is  how  to  develop  systematic explanations based  on 
case studies.2 King, Keohane, and Verba correctly urge 
us to move toward generalizing. They recommend that 
scholars first consider how to  define  the  universe of 
cases  of  which  their  case  is  an  element  and  then 
attempt to devise a way of drawing a sample from that 
universe. This is excellent advice. The problem is that, 
for many studies, their approach is not so easy to apply, 
at least in the initial stages of research. Many political 
scientists begin with an interest in a particular  phenom- 
enon,  such  as  the  American  Civil War,  the  French 
Revolution,  the  cause  of  World  War  I,  the  fall  of 
socialism, or the rise of the New Deal. At the beginning 
of  research, before  formulation of  an account of the 
phenomenon, the universe of cases containing a case of 
this sort is not obvious. Indeed, only after acquiring a 
significant understanding of the phenomenon-that  is, 
only  after  much  if  not  all  the  research  has  been 
concluded-  can a scholar have any prospect for defin- 
ing the larger universe of events. 
2 We are hardly the first to attempt this. See, for example, Eckstein 
1975, George  and McKeown  1985, Lijphart 1971, and Przeworski 
and Teune  1970. American Political Science Review  Vol. 94, No. 3 
The five of us, representing two different disciplines, 
all  use  the  analytic  narrative approach  to  achieve 
insights into different puzzles in very different historical 
periods. A major problem we address is how to develop 
systematic  explanations  for,  and  extract valid  infer- 
ences from, such cases. Each chapter identifies a puzzle 
unique to the place and period under study, offers an 
explanation by using the tools of analytic narrative, and 
lays  out  the  more  general  questions  raised  by  the 
specific study. Moreover, in each chapter, the author 
derives a model and confirms its implications with data. 
Greif investigates the growth of Genoa in the twelfth 
century and accounts for the puzzle of how the pod- 
esta, a ruler with no military power, resolved harmful 
clan conflict and promoted  economic  prosperity. His 
case has implications generally for issues of factional 
conflict  and  political  order.  Rosenthal  models  both 
long-term  and  divergent  institutional  change  among 
countries and offers new insights into the relationship 
between war and governmental regimes by investigat- 
ing the differences in taxation in France and England in 
the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries.  Levi  ac- 
counts for the variation in nineteenth-century conscrip- 
tion laws in France, the United States, and Prussia and 
finds that changing norms of  fairness, resulting from 
democratization, influence the timing and content  of 
institutional change. By focusing on the balance rule 
and how  it  deflected  civil war in the  United  States, 
Weingast advances the program of understanding the 
institutional  foundations  and  effects  of  federalism. 
Bates  analyzes the  rise and fall of  the  International 
Coffee  Agreement;  he  discovers  and  explains  why 
during World War II and the  Cold War the  United 
States,  a principal coffee  consumer, cooperated  with 
the cartel to stabilize prices. His major finding concerns 
the  circumstances under  which  a  political  basis  for 
organization will trump economic  competition  in  an 
international market. 
Our project represents a means  of  connecting  the 
seemingly  unique  event with  standard social  science 
methods.  First,  we  model  a  portion  of  the  critical 
dynamics in a way that affords tests of parts of the idea. 
This in itself is worthwhile. Second, we go farther and 
attempt to use the single case to generate hypotheses 
applicable to a larger set of cases. It is only in devel- 
oping the account or model that we are pushed toward 
seeing  what components  of  the  account  are testable 
and generalizable. 
Before  turning to  our response  to Jon Elster, it is 
worth considering his approach to  social science.  El- 
ster's review attacks all forms of social science  expla- 
nation that attempt to provide systematic answers to 
political,  economic,  and  historic  questions.  Analytic 
Narratives is simply his current foil. Elster has a very 
circumscribed conception  of  what  constitutes  useful 
theory. He claims (1999a) that social scientists can do 
little more than develop  a repertoire of mechanisms. 
His observation of "both the failures to predict and the 
predictions that failed" has entrenched his skepticism 
about the possibility of law-like explanations, a skepti- 
cism "bordering  on explanatory  nihilism,"  redeemed 
only by "the recognition  of the idea of a mechanism 
that could provide a measure of  explanatory power" 
(1999a, 2). We,  in contrast, believe  that although we 
may not be able to derive general laws, we nonetheless 
can develop, refine, and test theory-driven models and 
thus  employ  theory to  gain  deeper  insights into  the 
complex workings of the real world. Our book features 
both efforts to employ such models and discussions of 
the difficulties encountered when doing so.3 
ELSTER'S QUESTIONS 
Elster  poses  six  questions  and  an  additional  set  of 
concerns. The first is: "Do they agree with my charac- 
terization of analytic narrative as deductive history and 
with my statement that in practice this tends to mean 
rational choice history?"  This raises two questions, one 
about the role of rational choice theory and one about 
deductive history. Yes, we use and have a preference 
for  rational choice  theory, but  it  is  not  a  necessary 
condition for an analytic narrative. For example, one 
could  use  instead  prospect  theory  or  any systematic 
theory of individual choice, including nonrational the- 
ories of choice, to generate the predictions of individ- 
ual behavior. Aside from prospect theory, however, the 
alternatives are not sufficiently developed to provide a 
consistent technique for generating behavior in games. 
Turning to the issue of deductive history, we observe 
that analytic narratives are not deductive histories. In 
particular, we do not deduce the structure of the game 
from  first principles.  Of  course,  all  rational  choice 
models  are deductive, but the  deductive component, 
especially  when  applying game  theory,  assumes  the 
existence of an appropriate game to analyze. Yet, there 
exists no finite list of games or any reason to believe 
that there is one. By the same reasoning, we should not 
expect to find a French Revolution game, the Ameri- 
can  Civil War game,  or the  Genoese  game.  It  is  at 
precisely this point that an analytic narrative relies on 
inductive methods. We take pains to explain that the 
process of  deciding the  appropriate individuals, their 
preferences,  and the  structure of  the  environment- 
that is, the right game to use-is  an inductive process 
much like that used in modern comparative politics, by 
historical institutionalists, and by historians. Once that 
induction is complete, we can use the deductive meth- 
ods to study behavior within the context of the game. 
Elster's second  question  is: "Do  they agree that a 
plausible analytic narrative requires independent  evi- 
dence for intentions and beliefs?" This can be read as 
concerning  the  relationship  between  rational choice 
methods  and  interpretive  methods  that  tell  us  how 
individuals construct understandings of their world and 
give meaning to their life. Much of everyday life and of 
politics is about this, and rational choice theorists have 
for too long ignored these concerns. Luckily, there is a 
critical trend among a subset of rational choice theo- 
rists who have been trying to integrate interpretive and 
3A  related discussion in sociology was begun by Stinchcombe (1968, 
1978) and takes its current form in a debate sparked by Kiser and 
Hechter (1991, 1998; also see the responses by Quadagno and Knapp 
1992; Skocpol 1994; and Somers 1998). 
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rationalist  accounts.  An  article  by  John  Ferejohn 
(1991) exemplifies the effort, as does a recent book by 
David Laitin (1998). Some of our own work (Bates, de 
Figueiredo,  and Weingast  1998; Levi  1997; Rakove, 
Rutten, and Weingast 1999) is self-consciously part of 
this enterprise. 
To varying degrees the chapters in Analytic Narra- 
tives contribute to this program. Each of us has labored 
for years  on  the  subject on  which we  write.  Where 
necessary, we  learned new languages; where feasible, 
we worked in the field. Each of us spent long periods in 
the  archives, both public and private, and immersed 
ourselves  in the  secondary literature on  our subject. 
Indeed, immersion of this sort constitutes a core part of 
the  method we  advocate. We  seek  not  only to  bring 
theory to bear upon data but also to bring data to bear 
upon theory. We strongly endorse the use of qualitative 
materials, fieldwork, and the  painstaking reconstruc- 
tion of events as anticipated, observed, and interpreted 
by political actors. Such intimacy with detail, we argue, 
must  inform  the  selection  and  specification  of  the 
model to be tested  and should give us a grasp of the 
intentions and beliefs of the actors. 
There is also a narrower issue that Elster raises. He 
argues  that  without  independent  knowledge  of  the 
intentions and beliefs of the actors, the assumption of 
rationality adds little, resulting in explanations that are 
tautological. We disagree with Elster's equation of the 
words  of  actors with  their  intentions.4 For  example, 
there are two ways to read James Madison. The typical 
modern  political theory approach takes the  text and 
studies  its  ideas  apart  from  the  historical  context, 
assessing Madison's discussion of  an ideal world.  In 
contrast, a historical approach embeds Madison in his 
context and suggests that he was constructing a politi- 
cal document designed to persuade a certain group of 
citizens to support the proposed revisions to the U.S. 
Constitution. It is clear from Madison's own writing 
that he did not believe in this as the ideal. 
The point is that an assessment of Madison's inten- 
tions is an enormously difficult and necessarily specu- 
lative task. Because it is so difficult to judge intentions, 
rational choice  theorists  tend  to  rely instead  on  re- 
vealed  preferences  and behavior. Indeed,  even  in in- 
stances in which Elster claims we considered intentions 
directly, we did not do so. When Levi discusses legis- 
lative debates, she understands the legislators' public 
arguments as behavior; their rhetoric is often  calcu- 
lated and strategic, meant to  attract certain constitu- 
ents or change the votes of other legislators. 
Thus, to the specific question of the requirement of 
independent evidence for intentions and belief, we give 
a negative answer. 
Elster's  third  question  is:  "Do  they  agree  that  a 
plausible  analytic narrative must  be  at  the  level  of 
individual actors or, failing that, that specific reasons 
must  be  provided  in  a  given  case  to  explain  why 
4 Despite Elster's attempt to say otherwise, how else can one read his 
statement  that  Bates  through  interviews  and  Levi  through  interpre- 
tation  of  parliamentary debates  "provide  direct  evidence  about 
mental states" (Elster 2000, 693)? 
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aggregates can be treated as if they were individuals?" 
Highlighting  the  disjuncture between  individual and 
collective rationality, Elster takes us to task for relying 
on the use of aggregates: "the elite," "the North," and 
so forth. "Rational choice explanations divorced from 
methodological  individualism," he  maintains,  "have 
dubious value" (Elster 2000, 693). 
Whether  aggregation  is  justified  depends  on  the 
extent to which the problem of decision making within 
the aggregated unit can be examined separately from 
the  interactions  among  such  units.  The  question  is 
empirical, not theoretical. Aggregation is widely used 
in economics and political science because it is often an 
appropriate assumption that leads to tractable analysis 
highlighting processes at the aggregate level. Firms and 
families, rather than rational individuals, long stood on 
the supply and demand side of the economist's market, 
and political parties-along  with rational candidates- 
contest Downsian elections. In each case, the aggrega- 
tion assumption makes the analysis tractable. 
In the case of the Genoese  clans, for example, there 
is evidence (apart from the implications of the assump- 
tion that such separation is appropriate) that directly 
supports decision making by the clan. The constraint of 
"one person, one vote" will lead us away from under- 
standing the politics of Genoa as a republic. The same 
holds true with respect to other chapters. Should Bates 
go to the level of the individual American and his/her 
interest in the Cold War? 
At  least  two  of  us  went  farther  to  explore  the 
institutional mechanisms that produce (in the case of 
Bates) or that fail to produce (in the case of Weingast) 
a  well-defined  preference  ordering.  Contrary to  El- 
ster's claim, then,  we  do  not  ignore  the  paradox of 
collective irrationality  but, rather, employ it as a wedge 
with which  to  open  the  analysis of  the  influence  of 
institutions. 
Collectively, however, we urge caution about taking 
collectivities  as  actors,  capable  of  formulating  and 
pursuing coherent and sophisticated strategies. Each of 
us attempted to move to the highest level of disaggre- 
gation that was appropriate; thus, Weingast's unpack- 
ing of the Senate and Greif's treatment of free riding in 
the politics of Genoa. 
Elster's last three questions are: "Do they agree that 
standard rational choice theory needs to be modified to 
take  account  of  the  findings of  bounded  rationality 
theory  and of  behavioral economics?  Do  they  agree 
that it also needs to be modified to take into account 
nonrational motivations? Do they agree that at present 
there is no way to model nonrational motivations and 
how they interact with rational motivations, at least not 
in a way that yields determinate deductions? 
Long a student of rationality, Elster advances impor- 
tant  arguments regarding our use  of  rational choice 
theory.  As  do  others,  Elster  recognizes  that  people 
cannot possibly perform the calculations necessary for 
backward induction.  Instead,  he  urges us  to  assume 
bounded rather than full rationality. He also criticizes 
the assumption that actors can pursue objectives in an 
instrumentally  rational  manner,  arguing  that emotions 
and other nonrational  motivations  play a stronger  role American Political Science Review  Vol. 94, No. 3 
than we accord them. Finally, he suggests that recog- 
nizing  the  role  of  nonrational motivations  questions 
the very possibility of modeling in the way we do. 
As  a team, we are divided over the first of Elster's 
arguments; some  of us agree and find it increasingly 
difficult to defend the assumption of full rationality as 
a "necessary convenience." But even those  of us dis- 
comfited by this assumption reject Elster's implication. 
Elster implies that inferences drawn from the use  of 
models  that  incorporate  such  assumptions  must  be 
flawed, whereas we find some of these models  highly 
insightful. They help us understand just how and why 
the balance rule worked to preserve political order in 
the United  States before the Civil War; just how and 
why the rules of the International Coffee Organization 
influenced  the  allocation  of  the  "coffee  dollar"  in 
international markets; and just how and why an official 
(the podesta') with just twenty soldiers brought peace 
and prosperity to  the  most powerful city-state in the 
twelfth century Mediterranean world. The burden falls 
on Elster, then, to show how the assumptions we made 
led us to err. Just how were we misled by them? How 
would  the  outcomes  have  differed had we  assumed 
boundedly rational actors? 
We have no difficultly conceding that emotional life 
is  powerful  and  affects  behavior.  We  also  have  no 
difficulty conceding  that  a  rational  choice  account 
grounded only in material interests may be both unre- 
alistic and analytically limited. For Elster's critique to 
carry more force, however, it is necessary that he show 
how  the  inclusion  of  nonrational  motivations would 
improve  the  power  of  our  particular analyses.  We 
employed  models  to  explain,  not  to  describe;  our 
models  therefore  need  not  capture every feature  of 
human life. The ratio between the variance they con- 
front and the variance they explain provides a measure 
of their success. Until Elster shows how explicit refer- 
ence  to  emotional life and other nonrational motiva- 
tions  would  enhance  that  ratio  in  the  accounts  we 
offer,5 his criticism points to an omission but not to an 
error arising from that omission. He  runs the  risk of 
weakening the power of his explanation. At the least, 
his argument fails to point out errors of commission, as 
he suggests. 
Elster has been  a preeminent  advocate of  rational 
choice  theory  and  then  of  considering  nonrational 
motivations.  In  social  science  today,  the  attempt  to 
develop better models of choice and action represents 
an extraordinarily  important and exciting program, one 
to which we all subscribe to varying degrees. Analytic 
Narratives is,  after all, dedicated  to  Douglass  North, 
whose  recent work focuses  on developing better cog- 
nitive models (1991; also see Denzau and North 1994), 
and, among us, Levi in particular is identified with the 
project of  understanding the limits of rationality and 
rational choice (Alt, Levi, and Ostrom 1999; Cook and 
Levi 1990; Braithwaite and Levi 1998). 
Yet,  Elster's program fails what  Kenneth  Shepsle 
Bilster attempts  to  do  this  in  his  1999  books,  but  he  does  not 
demonstrate there or in his review how his claims produce different 
analyses than the ones we offer. 
once called "the first law of wing-walking,"  which holds 
that you do not let go of something until you have a 
grip on something else. We do not throw out models 
based on rationality just because we  agree that there 
are  nonrational  aspects  of  choice.  We  are  likely to 
learn quite a bit in the  next ten years about how to 
extend choice-theoretic  methods to include emotional 
and nonrational elements. The approach will be much 
stronger for this. But we do not believe that this now 
requires  abandoning  our  current tools.  Nonrational 
approaches to choice  are not yet far enough along to 
provide an analytic approach that challenges or extends 
the traditional choice framework, at least as applied to 
empirical research outside  the  laboratory (see,  how- 
ever, Jones 1999). There are, nonetheless, scholars who 
are beginning to integrate expressive and rational bases 
of action. For example, Elster's own work on emotions 
and  social  norms  (1991a,  1999a,  1999b)  explores  a 
range of useful phenomena  and mechanisms that will 
prove useful. Sunita Parikh (in process) explores riots 
as events whose explanation requires understanding a 
mix of motivations and behavior. Thus, in contrast to 
Elster's implied thesis (in question six) that "there is no 
way of modeling nonrational motivations and how they 
interact with rational motivations, at least not in a way 
that yields  determinate  deductions," we  believe  that 
there are good  first models  of how noninterest-based 
and even nonrational motivations might interact with 
rational motivations  (e.g.,  Bates,  de  Figueiredo,  and 
Weingast 1998; Ensminger and Knight 1997; Levi 1997; 
Lupia  and  McCubbins  1998).  As  these  new  choice- 
theoretic approaches become  more defined and com- 
plete, we believe they can be easily integrated into the 
analytic narrative framework. 
UNCERTAINTY 
Having attempted to respond to Elster's questions, we 
now turn to another major criticism Elster makes in the 
text,  our  purported failure  to  deal  adequately  with 
uncertainty. He invites us to impale ourselves upon one 
of two horns, both chosen by him. On the one hand, he 
criticizes us for failing to employ models that take into 
account  the  effect  of  uncertainty; on  the  other,  he 
brands such models as "artificial." 
Elster lumps together the separate issues of uncer- 
tainty and incomplete information. We use the concept 
of uncertainty in our chapters more than he recognizes. 
Consider,  for  example,  Greif s  analysis, which  takes 
into account uncertainty about who will win the war, 
whether the emperor will come, whether the podesta' 
and one clan will ally, and so on. 
We are more cautious in applying models of incom- 
plete information, however. Because of their complex- 
ity, explicit reliance on  Bayesian updating (which we 
doubt people  use  in reality), and artificiality, we  felt 
that we  should apply them only when failing to treat 
uncertainty would imply ignoring a central feature of 
the puzzle under investigation. In most instances, we 
found we could avoid the use of such models. We, like 
Buster,  believe that political actors occupy a terrain 
clouded by uncertainty,  but we also believe it is char- 
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acterized by sharp institutional features and powerful 
political forces. Events that take place in such settings 
do possess a high degree of contingency. When we give 
insufficient weight to  the  role  of  chance, we  deprive 
ourselves  of  the  opportunity  to  assess  the  level  of 
confidence with which we  can advocate our explana- 
tions. If we succeed in apprehending the major forces 
at play, then the systematic component  of our expla- 
nations should prevail over that which is random. 
"JUST-SO" STORIES 
Elster suggests we are guilty of the very sin we try 
assiduously to avoid, namely, writing "just-so stories." 
We admit that it is difficult to elude this problem. In 
the  analysis  of  a  single  case  in  biology-or  social 
science-a  just-so story can establish the plausibility of 
the theoretical perspective, but we resisted the temp- 
tation to  stop  at that point.  Instead, we  laid out the 
basis for our analytic decisions, indicated the deviations 
from the predictions of our initial models, and applied 
the criterion of falsifiability to our hypotheses. 
"We  identify  the  actors,  the  decision  points  they 
faced,  the  choices  they  made,  the  paths  taken  and 
shunned, and the manner in which their choices gen- 
erated events and outcomes" (Bates et al. 1998, 13-4), 
and we do this in each of the single-authored chapters. 
We  attempt  to  make  clear  the  preferences  and  to 
model the outcome of choices. By this means, we aim 
to  offer both  a recognizable historical representation 
and an explanation of significant institutional arrange- 
ments  and changes. The  analytic narrative approach 
gains  credibility when  the  equilibria of  our  models 
"imply the outcome we describe" (p. 12). 
Moreover, "when history contradicts the model,  so 
much the worse for the model" (Goldstone  1998, 533). 
For example, when a model based only on self-interest 
fails to account for the change in citizen reactions to 
substitution and commutation, Levi employs an alter- 
native that permits her to explore the implications of 
the  more  narrow with  the  broader  rational  choice 
model.  In the Bates chapter, the failure of the chain 
store  paradox model  highlighted  the  significance  of 
high fixed costs in the production function of  coffee. 
The  Stigler/Pelzman  model  also  foundered,  but  its 
internal  inconsistency  drove  Bates  to  recognize  the 
significance of security interests and the political role 
of large corporations. 
Contrary to what Elster argues, we  do not  employ 
formal theory to construct just-so stories. The theories 
are tested against the stories, and they can and do fail. 
From their failure, we then learn about the case. We 
use deductive theories for inductive purposes. As our 
introduction and conclusion describe, each of us goes 
back and forth between the model and the data, testing 
our ideas against reality. 
Elster (1989b, 3-10;  1999a, 1-47)  himself makes "a 
plea for mechanisms," for the necessity to explanation 
of  identifying  the  causal  mechanisms.  Elster  argues 
that dozens of potential mechanisms potentially under- 
pin human  behavior,  which  he takes  to mean  that  there 
is no way  to predict  ex ante  which  mechanism  will come 
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into play or, if many are at work, which will predomi- 
nate.  If this correctly characterizes Elster's position, 
then only after the fact can one suggest which mecha- 
nisms work. As a consequence, his method is far more 
susceptible to "curve fitting" than is our own. 
We  believe  that  rational  choice  offers  a  superior 
approach because  it  generates  propositions  that  are 
refutable. Being subject to standard methods of evalu- 
ation-such  as the out-of-sample testing of predictions 
and the systematic pursuit of falsification-the  models 
we employ are not mere just-so stories. 
THE  CASE STUDIES 
Elster finds much to which he objects in our book. By 
his  own  admission,  however,  much  of  his  specific 
critique of  the  chapters focuses  on  secondary issues. 
What underlies this kind of criticism, however, is his 
belief  that "to be  analytic is above all to be obsessed 
with clarity and explicitness, to put oneself in the place 
of  the  reader  and  avoid  ambiguity, vagueness,  and 
hidden assumptions" (Elster 2000, 691). He argues that 
"not many, if any, of the chapters in AN live up to his 
demand," (p. 691). We beg to differ. We feel confident 
that most readers will find that each author produced 
an analytic narrative which both advances knowledge 
and  produces  generalizable  and  falsifiable  implica- 
tions.6 And  that  formal  reasoning was  key  to  these 
contributions. 
Rather  than  go  through each  chapter  and  debate 
each  of  Elster's  specific  second-order  charges,  we 
addressed many of  his more  general  and theoretical 
critiques in  our  answers to  his  six questions.  There 
remain a few points to which we need to respond. 
Greif's Chapter 
Elster  argues that the  analysis does  not  support the 
assertion  that  external threat  or  internal  innovation 
released  resources for use  in cooperative  endeavors. 
He is absolutely correct; the analysis does not support 
his  assertion.  But  it  never  attempted  to  do  so.  The 
focus is on a different issue, namely, the motivation to 
cooperate, not the ability to do so. 
Rosenthal's  Chapter 
At no point does Elster contest Rosenthal's claim that 
the  conclusions  follow  from his model  or the  fit be- 
tween the implications of the model and the historical 
records. Changing the division of spoils, the "war  bias" 
of the crown, or the incentives of the elite to free ride 
would  indeed  change the predictions that issue from 
Rosenthal's  model  and lead  to  convergence  between 
the  policies  of  England  and  France,  just  as  Elster 
claims. But then the modified model would be contra- 
dicted by fact and thus proven wrong! 
6 We  all draw on related research available in published and forth- 
coming material. See, for example, Bates 1997, Levi 1997, Greif n.d., 
Hoffman and Rosenthal  1997, and Weingast n.d. American Political Science Review  Vol. 94, No. 3 
Levi's  Chapter 
Elster's  condemnation  of  Levi's logic  rests more  on 
misunderstanding and  honest  disagreement  than  on 
pinpointing logical flaws in her argumentation. Elster 
maintains that "abolition of replacement and introduc- 
tion of universal suffrage were part of the same ground 
swell-not  that the latter was the cause of the former" 
(Elster 2000, 688); this is Levi's explanation, too.  He 
critiques her for holding a different view than his about 
the relationship between fairness and rationality and a 
distinct interpretation of the actors' preferences. Elster 
correctly chastises her for inconsistent wording; price is 
indeed  an  object,  even  in  the  considerations  of  the 
wealthy. But he does not seem to disagree on what is 
easier or less costly. 
Weingast's  Chapter 
Elster  questions  Weingast's  principal argument that 
Americans constructed antebellum political stability in 
part on  the  balance  rule.  His  main  criticism is  that 
pairing  occurred  because  southerners  blackmailed 
northerners  by  holding  the  admission  of  northern 
states hostage to the admission of southern ones. This 
assertion supports rather than contradicts Weingast's 
thesis.  The  South  held  up  admission  of  free  states 
precisely to maintain a balance, and it used its sectional 
veto  to  do  this. Elster's comments  therefore  add to 
Weingast's argument by showing how the balance rule 
was self-enforcing during this period. 
Bates's  Chapter 
Elster criticizes Bates  for not  showing how the  con- 
sumer  side  of  the  market  enforced  the  agreement. 
Elster appears to be looking for a unilateral form of 
intervention; indeed, he cites one attempt (by the U.S. 
government) and conjectures regarding the possibility 
of  another  (by  U.S.  corporations,  acting  in  Central 
America).  But the very form of  the  explanations ad- 
vanced  by  Bates  rest  on  game-theoretic  reasoning; 
rather than  seek  forms  of  unilateral  imposition,  he 
seeks behaviors that would prevail in equilibrium. 
In short, our responses underscore a larger problem 
with  the  review: Elster's  repeated  failure  to  engage 
with the main points made by the  essays or his mis- 
reading of them. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF ARGUMENTS 
Elster's criticism of our work is, and was intended to 
be, powerful. It is a "scorched earth" review, and we 
have tried to resist the temptation to respond in kind. 
However,  we  have,  on  occasion,  felt  compelled  to 
answer some of his criticisms with a tone that matches 
his,  especially  since  much  of  the  power  of  Elster's 
critique is due to the substitution of his premises for 
our  own  and  then  showing  that  our  results  do  not 
follow. He  advances his premises so diffidently that it 
may not appear reasonable to object, but there is little 
diffidence in the manner in which he claims to clinch 
the subsequent argument, even though the  argument 
that fails is his, not our own. 
Elster  often  substitutes his  opinions  for  our judg- 
ments. Admitting that he is not an expert on French 
politics  of  the  period,  he  nonetheless  feels  free  to 
reconstruct  the  preferences  of  social  groupings,  as 
depicted  by Levi.  If he  cannot  see  that  it would  be 
reasonable to suppose that the groups prefer one form 
of recruitment to another, then perhaps it is because, 
unlike  Levi,  he  has  not  immersed  himself  in  the 
necessary evidence. Although  he  admits he  is "not a 
specialist"  (Elster  2000,  690)  on  nineteenth-century 
American  politics,  Elster  nonetheless  feels  free  to 
"doubt the existence" (p. 689) of a convention regard- 
ing the admission of states to the Union. He is entitled 
to challenge our logic, and we cannot simply resort to 
our detailed knowledge of the cases as our defense. But 
given that we attempted to combine reasonable claims 
with in-depth research, it is incumbent upon Elster to 
demonstrate how his alternative and abstractly derived 
construction matters empirically. At issue is more than 
a  question  of  taste.  At  issue  is  a  better  or  worse 
explanation of actual events. 
Elster repeatedly seeks to ensnare his prey in double 
binds. On the one hand, for example, he calls for the 
clarity that only, he claims, a formal model can provide; 
on the other hand, he then attacks a model-"to  the 
extent I understand it" (Elster 2000, 689)-for  failing 
to  add "to the verbal presentation" (p. 689).  On the 
one  hand, he  criticizes a chapter for  deviating from 
"standard  rational choice theory" (p. 695); on the other 
hand, he condemns the authors for depicting actors as 
being  fully  rational.  He  endorses  collective  action 
theory  but  less  than  a  page  later  brands  collective 
action theory for being "rococo (or is it baroque?)" (p. 
695).  The  authors  are  thus  damned  if  they  do  and 
damned if they do not. 
Elster cites distinguished figures, long dead, to add 
authority  to  his  arguments,  but  he  often  does  an 
injustice to their actual words and meaning. For exam- 
ple, Elster enlists Pascal, applying to our enterprise the 
phrases applied by Pascal to the mechanistic biology of 
Descartes: "ridiculous-pointless,  uncertain, and ardu- 
ous." When  he wrote these  words, Pascal had aban- 
doned  philosophy  for  faith.  For  our  part,  we  are 
engaged  in secular pursuits, and we  take inspiration 
from history's vindication of  Descartes;  "mechanistic 
biology" has proven fertile, yielding major advances in 
medicine and medical engineering. 
Rhetoric helps Elster forcefully communicate his low 
opinion of our work. The tone is Olympian and harsh, 
and it diverts attention from his failure to engage with 
the substance of our cases and our method. 
CONCLUSION 
Elster criticizes us at three levels. First, he claims that 
we fail to execute the program we propose; that is, we 
fail to apply skillfully or persuasively formal theories to 
elucidate  complex  cases. We  believe  him wrong and 
encourage  readers  to  explore  the  case  studies  and 
decide for themselves. 
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Second,  Elster  argues that our framework is itself 
flawed or, at best, premature; he chides us for "exces- 
sive ambition" in attempting "deductive rational choice 
modeling  of  large-scale  historical  phenomena."  His 
real opponent is rational choice theory. But as a critic 
of  the  analytic  narrative  approach,  Elster  fails  to 
engage with the main purposes of our book: How can 
we build and test systematic explanations based on case 
studies?  How  can  we  move  from  the  world  of  a 
problem to  be  studied to  a test  to  be  administered? 
Moreover, the analytic narrative method easily affords 
substituting more general modes  of  "choice" for the 
explicitly-and  limited-rational  choice  game theory. 
Put  simply, we  believe  that  the  debate  over  choice 
versus rational choice  is orthogonal to  the  issues we 
raise. 
The burden is on Elster to explicate a better meth- 
odological alternative that can actually inform empiri- 
cal research. This means demonstrating how the weak- 
nesses  of  rational choice  adversely affect the  use we 
make of it. Unless  Elster can show how the  assump- 
tions  of  rationality lead  us  to  conclusions  that  are 
wrong, he is merely restating obvious truths rather than 
uncovering material errors. Unless  he  can offer us a 
better set of tools, we shall proceed with those we have. 
Finally, Elster criticizes Analytic Narratives because 
we espouse an ambition to a genuine social science. We 
believe that generalizations are possible and that many 
have emerged in the social sciences. Our project rep- 
resents an attempt to bring some analytical tools to the 
task of studying unique case studies, a question long of 
interest to political scientists. 
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